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Abstract 
 
We examine the implications of stock ownership by index funds for shareholder value. 
Consistent with recent findings that stock ownership by passive funds contributes to improved 
governance, we document a strong positive relation between the duration of passive fund holdings 
and subsequent stock performance.  This positive relation is more pronounced for firms with recent 
poor performance, and for smaller firms and firms with higher allocation weights in passive funds’ 
portfolios. Our results support the view that index funds, although passive in their investment 
decisions, successfully contribute to long-term value creation by actively engaging with firms on 
matters of governance. 
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1. Introduction 
There has been a dramatic growth in the assets of passively managed index mutual funds in 
recent years.  For example, according to the Investment Companies Institute (ICI), domestic equity 
index mutual funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs) received $1.2 trillion in net new cash, 
including reinvested dividends, between 2007 and 2015.  In stark contrast, actively managed 
domestic equity mutual funds experienced net outflows of $835 billion (even after accounting for 
reinvested dividends) over the same period.  As of the end of 2015, domestic index fund assets 
accounted for about 35% of total assets held by equity mutual funds.  
Not surprisingly, the growing importance of passive institutional investors such as index 
mutual funds has been the focus of much interest and has sparked to considerable debate regarding 
their impact on firm-level governance.  In a recent paper, Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016) 
examine the role of passive mutual fund companies in corporate governance and find that such 
investors are not merely passive owners.  In particular, they find that passive investors appear to 
play an important role in pushing their portfolio companies to adopt shareholder-friendly policies, 
including an increase in the number of independent directors and the elimination of poison pills 
and dual-class share structures. More generally, the authors document that passive ownership is 
associated with a decline in shareholder support for management proposals and an increase in 
support for governance-related shareholder proposals.  Furthermore, longer-term passive stock 
ownership is associated with significant improvements in the firm’s return on assets and Tobin’s 
Q.  These results are broadly consistent with the conclusions of earlier studies that found that 
institutional investors, including those that index a large portion of their portfolios, can affect 
corporate behavior (e.g., Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999; 
Gillan and Starks, 2000; Harford, Kecskés, and Mansi, 2018).   
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Motivated by recent results in the literature, in this paper we examine whether improvements 
in firm-level governance due to long-term passive ownership by index funds lead to improved 
returns to investors in the affected firms. Unlike actively managed funds, index funds do not have 
discretion over which stocks to hold, and in particular, they do not have the option of selling stocks 
that underperform.  Hence, it could be argued that index funds have a stronger incentive to 
undertake improvements in the governance of their portfolio firms.2  As F. William McNabb III, 
Vanguard’s Chairman and CEO, wrote in a recent letter3 to the boards of directors of Vanguard 
funds’ largest portfolio holdings,  
We are large, we don’t make a lot of noise, we are focused on the long term, and we don’t 
tend to rush into and out of investments. In the past, some have mistakenly assumed that our 
predominantly passive management style suggests a passive attitude with respect to 
corporate governance. Nothing could be further from the truth. We want to see our clients’ 
investments grow over the long term, and good governance is a key to helping companies 
maximize their returns to shareholders. 
If index funds’ efforts in improving firm governance and long-term value are effective, it is 
reasonable to expect that their substantial holdings will have an impact on stock performance as 
well. We provide direct evidence on this important issue in this paper. 
We identify a sample of U.S. passive and active equity funds during the period 2003:Q1 to 
2015:Q3.  The sample includes 608 funds classified as passive equity funds, including index 
                                                          
2 For example, according to the Global Governance Principles adopted by the largest U.S. public pension fund, 
CalPERS, which has a substantial allocation to indexed portfolio investments, “CalPERS prefers constructive 
engagement to divesting as a means of affecting the conduct of entities in which it invests. Investors that divest lose 
their ability as shareowners to influence the company to act responsibly.”  (Source: CalPERS Global Governance 
Principles, Updated: March 16, 2015, p. 9)      
3 https://about.vanguard.com/vanguard-proxy-voting/CEO_Letter_03_02_ext.pdf 
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mutual funds and ETFs.  We obtain data on stocks held by funds using the Thomson-Reuters 
mutual fund holdings (S12) database. It is likely that passive funds’ impact on governance would 
be stronger in the case of stocks they hold for a long time. Accordingly, at the end of every quarter 
we construct a measure of the duration of ownership of each stock by every fund during the 
previous 20 quarters, following Cremers and Pareek (2016). We then average this measure across 
all passive funds to construct an overall duration measure for each stock.  For each stock, this 
measure reflects the weighted duration of the investment in the stock by all passive funds.  
Our key hypothesis links the strength of monitoring by passive fund investors, as reflected 
in the duration of holdings measure, to future stock returns.  In tests based on cross-sectional 
regressions, we find that our passive fund stock holding duration measure is significantly and 
positively related to future raw and excess returns at horizons up to 24 months.  For example, the 
results imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in the (log of the) passive funds’ stock holding 
duration measure for a particular stock is associated with an increase in the stock’s quarterly return 
by 48 basis points over the next 3 months.  The corresponding increase in the stock’s annual return 
is 189 basis points over the next 12 months, and 161 basis points during the second year.  Our 
results are qualitatively similar when using an alternative measure for duration of passive funds’ 
stock holdings based on the funds’ portfolio turnover (see, for example, Gaspar, Massa, and Matos, 
2005).  Interestingly, we find that a similar stock holding duration measure based on the portfolio 
holdings of actively managed funds has much weaker predictive ability for future stock returns.  
Specifically, in predictive return regressions, the average coefficients on the active funds’ 
(excluding closet indexers) holdings duration measures are 0.308 and 0.759 for next quarter returns 
and next year returns, and are only marginally significant at the 10% level for next quarter returns. 
The coefficients decline in magnitude to 0.247 and 0.492 and become statistically insignificant 
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when the passive funds’ holdings duration measure is included as a control.  We also show that 
our results are not driven by closet indexers: After controlling for passive funds’ holding duration, 
closet indexers have a limited role in predicting returns. 
Next, we adopt a portfolio approach and sort funds into quintile portfolios according to the 
duration measure based on passive funds’ stock holdings.  A spread portfolio that is long the 
longest duration fund portfolio and short the shortest duration fund portfolio earns a monthly 4-
factor (three Fama-French factors and the Carhart momentum factor) alpha of 60.3 basis points (or 
7.2% annually) and a 5-factor (four factors plus the Pastor and Stambaugh liquidity factor) alpha 
that equals 63.7 basis points (or 7.6% annually) during the period 2003:Q1 to 2015:Q3.   
What explains the predictive ability of our measure of the duration of passive funds’ stock 
holdings?  To explore this issue further, we split the sample of stocks based on their performance 
during the previous 12 months and 36 months.  If the predictive ability is indeed driven by the 
improvements in firm-level governance brought about by  long-term ownership by passive funds, 
we would expect a stronger positive relation between the duration of holdings measure and future 
stock returns for the worst performing stocks.  Similarly, we would expect this relation to be 
stronger for stocks with smaller market capitalization, which may be more susceptible to the 
influence of passive fund owners, especially when they are large.  We also expect a stronger 
relation between the duration of holdings measure and future stock returns during periods in which 
the market is more volatile, when passive funds are likely able to exert a stronger influence on 
management.   
Our results based on cross-sectional tests provide support for each of these three predictions.  
The predictive ability of the duration of holdings measure for future returns at the 3-month, 12-
month, and 24-month horizon is stronger for the worst performing stocks (i.e., stocks with below- 
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median performance during the past 12 months or past 36 months). In addition, the predictive 
ability of the passive fund stock holdings’ duration measure is stronger for smaller firms, i.e., for 
firms with below-median market capitalization. The measure’s predictive ability is also more 
pronounced during more volatile market periods.  
As a further test of the importance of the monitoring role played by passive funds and its 
impact on future stock returns, we include in our test design a control variable that is a measure of 
the passive funds’ aggregate allocation weight to a particular stock.  In cross-sectional tests, the 
interaction term involving the allocation weight-based variable and the duration of holdings 
measure is significantly positively related to future stock returns.  The relationship is positive and 
significant at multiple horizons up to 1 year ahead.  These results suggest that the passive funds’ 
allocation weight has significant, marginal predictive power for stock returns at both short and 
long horizons.   
Finally, we compare a subsample of stocks that rank at the bottom among stocks in the 
Russell 1000 index, based on market capitalization, to those that rank near the top among stocks 
in the Russell 2000 index.  Stocks near the boundary of the index membership cutoff are likely to 
be quite similar in their characteristics, with one important exception.  Since index funds’ stock 
allocations are based on market valuations, stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 index would be 
weighted more heavily in portfolios of index funds (targeting the Russell 2000 index).  On the 
other hand, stocks near the bottom of the Russell 1000 index will be featured less prominently in 
portfolios of index funds (targeting the Russell 1000 index).  This distinction allows us to perform 
a relatively clean test of the impact of passive fund ownership on stock returns.  We find that the 
predictive ability of passive funds’ holdings duration measure for future stock returns is much 
stronger for stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 index compared to those at the bottom of the 
 7 
 
 
Russell 1000 index. This finding is consistent with the idea that significant holdings of passive 
funds are associated with more effective monitoring by the funds.  
We rule out the possibility that our results are driven solely by the potential persistent 
buying-related price pressure experienced by stocks that are constituents of various market 
indexes.   In particular, our results are robust to controls for lagged stocks returns that proxy for 
past asset flows.  Furthermore, we confirm the predictive ability of the holdings’ duration measure 
at longer horizons up to 2 years.   
We also address concerns that reverse causality can explain our results. Under this 
explanation, the better performing stocks would mechanically enjoy a longer duration of holdings. 
To explore this possibility, we examine the correlation between the duration of holdings measure 
and past stock returns. We find that the correlation is in fact quite weak.               
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the duration of fund holdings or trade 
frequency, and fund performance.  In this context, Cremers and Pareek (2016) document that 
among active funds with high active share, the funds that trade infrequently tend to outperform on 
average by about 2%per year.  Furthermore, among funds with long holding durations, the high 
active share funds outperform the low active share funds.  They attribute their results to the ability 
of a subset of skilled active fund managers who are better at identifying instances of security 
mispricing that are eventually corrected over the long term.   
Our results are also consistent with the findings of Harford, et al., (2018), who document the 
favorable impact of long-term investors on shareholder returns.  In contrast to Harford et al. (2018), 
whose primary focus is on the impact of investor horizons on corporate decisions, our analysis 
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specifically focuses on the implications of stock ownership by index funds.4   Hence, in our 
analysis we directly identify passive fund investors, namely, index funds and ETFs, rather than 
relying on a noisy activeness measure (e.g., the active share) in order to classify investors as being 
active or passive.  It should also be noted that index funds are long-term investors by design, and 
their investors are more likely to be patient compared to investors in active funds. Since index 
funds do not engage in active security selection, our results suggest that the monitoring role of 
passive investors is the most likely explanation for our findings. On the other hand, closet indexers 
(identified using the active share measure) have considerable flexibility and discretion in their 
investment choices. Their motivations and investment constraints can be quite different from that 
of genuine index funds. Indeed, our results show that after controlling for the effect of index funds 
and ETFs, duration measures related to stock ownership by either closet indexers or active funds 
with long-term horizons are unrelated to future stock returns.     
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops our main testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data, sample, and variable construction. Section 4 presents the 
main findings on the effect of passive funds’ long-term investments on stock performance and 
discusses tests of various hypotheses. Section 5 compares passive funds and active funds, and 
Section 6 concludes.        
2. Testable hypotheses 
Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016) show that passive funds are not merely passive owners; 
instead, they play an important role in firm governance. If passive funds have the incentive to 
                                                          
4 As Harford et al. (2018) acknowledge, “Itis not our objective to study the consequences of indexing as such.” (p. 
429).  In order to establish a causal link between investor horizons and corporate outcomes, for part of the analysis 
they classify investors into “indexers” and “non-indexers.”  This classification is based on an active share measure 
calculated for the institutional investors in their sample.  
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monitor firms in their portfolios and are effective in improving the firms’ governance, their long-
term holdings should favorably impact their stock performance relative to firms that are not in 
their portfolio.  As we discuss in the introduction (and subsequently in more detail in the data 
section), we use a stock’s passive holdings duration (churn ratio) to measure passive funds’ long-
term commitment to the stock. We therefore propose the following hypothesis.  
H1: A stock’s passive holdings duration (churn ratio) positively (negatively) predicts future 
returns.  
As “permanent” shareholders, passive funds do not have the option of selling their positions 
in underperforming stocks. Hence, we expect that they have a stronger incentive to monitor and 
influence firms that have been doing poorly in the past.  This suggests the following hypothesis. 
H2: The return predictability of the passive holdings’ duration is stronger for underperforming 
stocks.  
Given their monitoring incentives, passive funds’ ability to influence the firm depends on 
the size of the firm. Everything else equal, we expect that passive funds have a stronger impact on 
small firm performance. Further, we expect that the passive funds’ monitoring incentive would be 
stronger during more volatile periods, when there is greater uncertainty about the performance of 
the stocks they invest in.  Hence, we have the following hypothesis.  
H3: The return predictability of the passive holdings’ duration is stronger for smaller firms, and 
during more volatile market conditions.  
Many passive funds invest in hundreds of stocks. Despite the resources available to large 
funds, it would be difficult for them to pay equal attention to all stocks. Hence, we expect that 
passive funds would be more effective in monitoring stocks that have greater weights in their 
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holdings (adjusting for the market weight of the stocks). Accordingly, we have the following 
hypothesis. 
H4: The return predictability of passive funds holdings duration is stronger for stocks with greater 
excess weights (relative to market value weights) in passive funds’ portfolios.  
Recent literature has argued that active funds’ long-term holdings outperform passive funds’ 
holdings. We note that by their design, passive funds are long-term investors and have incentives 
to monitor and influence firm governance and performance. If their monitoring is effective and 
favorably impacts stock returns, it is possible that some “long-term” active funds mimic passive 
funds’ long-term investment holdings. This suggests the following hypothesis. 
H5: Controlling for the passive funds’ holdings duration effect, the return predictability of the 
active funds’ holdings duration is diminished.  
3. Data and sample construction   
3.1. Passive and active funds sample construction 
Our data for U.S. mutual funds comes from the CRSP Survivor Bias Free U.S. mutual fund 
database and Thomson Reuters mutual fund holdings (S12) database linked by MFLINKS. We 
exclude bond funds and international funds to ensure that only domestic equity mutual funds are 
left in the sample.  Additionally, we require that equity funds in our sample have allocations to 
common stocks between 80% and 105%, hold at least 10 stocks, and manage assets in excess of 
$5 million. Since fund characteristics provided by CRSP are at the share class level, we calculate 
value-weighted fund characteristics, such as turnover ratio, across multiple share classes within a 
fund using total net assets (TNA) as weights. Finally, we require that funds in our sample have 
available shareholding information and have at least 1year’s worth of holdings history. 
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To classify funds as either passively managed funds or actively managed funds, we examine 
the CRSP index fund/ETF indicators. To identify passive funds that are not explicitly identified 
by these indicators, we follow Appel, et al.(2016) and screen the remaining sample using keywords 
in their names.5 The remaining funds in our sample are classified as active funds. This procedure 
yields 608 passive funds and 2,732 active funds over the period from first quarter of 2003 to third 
quarter of 2015. We use 2003 as the starting year for the sample since there are substantially fewer 
passive funds prior to this year. We compute the percentage of stocks’ shares outstanding owned 
by passive funds (index%) and by active funds (active%) at the end of each quarter. 
3.2. Stock long-term ownership by passive (active) funds 
We focus on U.S. common stocks (share code 10 or 11) that are listed on NYSE, AMEX, or 
NASDAQ from 2003.Q1 to 2015.Q3. We eliminate stocks with prices below $1 or above $1,000. 
Further, we require that a stock be held by a fund for at least 2 consequent quarters to exclude the 
occasional addition (removal) of stocks into (out of) funds. 
We construct two measures of funds’ (long-term) investment on a stock. The first measure 
is the stock-level “duration” measure, as motivated by Cremers and Pareek (2016). By tracing back 
the holding periods and weighting the buys and sells in each period, this measure captures how 
long a stock has continuously been held by one fund at a particular time. Specifically, at the end 
of quarter t, the holding duration of stock i in passive fund j is given by: 
           𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑇 = ∑ (
(𝑇 − 𝑡)𝛼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝐻𝑖,𝑗,𝑇−𝑤 + 𝐵𝑖,𝑗
) +
𝑊 ∗ 𝐻𝑖,𝑗,𝑇−𝑊
𝐻𝑖,𝑗,𝑇−𝑤 + 𝐵𝑖,𝑗
𝑇
𝑡=𝑇−𝑊+1
 ,                                              (1) 
                                                          
5 The Strings we use to identify index funds are: Index, Idx, Indx, Ind_, Russell, S&P, S & P, SandP, SP, DOW, Dow, 
DJ, MSCI, Bloomberg, KBW, NASDAQ, NYSE, STOXX, FTSE, Wilshire, Morningstar, 100, 400, 500, 600, 900, 
1000, 1500, 2000, 5000, ishares, powershares, SPDR, QQQ, ETF, EXCHANGE TRADED, EXCHANGE-TRADED, 
PROFUNDS, SPA MG, MARKET GRADER. 
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 where 𝛼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is change in percentage of shares outstanding of stock i held by index j between quarter 
t-1 and quarter t, and  𝛼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 > 0 for buys and 𝛼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 < 0 for sells. The term 𝐻𝑖𝑗,𝑇−𝑊  is the percentage 
of total shares outstanding of stock i held by fund j at the end of quarter T-W; and 𝐵𝑖,𝑗  is percentage 
of total shares outstanding of stock i bought by fund j during time period between quarters T-W 
and T. Consistent with the literature, we choose w=20, since any trading prior to 5 years ago would 
not be as relevant when assessing holding decisions in year 0. Next, we compute stock duration 
across all passive funds by either equally weighting 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑇or averaging 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑇  
using passive fund ownership of the stock index % as the weight across all passive funds that hold 
the stock:   
                                     𝐷𝑢𝑟 − 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑇 =
∑ 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑇𝑗
𝑁𝑗
                                                                   (2) 
                                     𝐷𝑢𝑟 − 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑇 =
∑ 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑇 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥%𝑖,𝑗,𝑇𝑗
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥%𝑖,𝑗,𝑇𝑗
                                 (3) 
Similarly, we construct the duration measures based on active funds 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑎𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑇  . We next 
compute stock duration in active funds by equally weighting 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑎𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑇 or averaging 
Duration-aci,j,T using active fund ownership of the stock active% as the weight across all active 
funds that hold the stock:   
                       𝐷𝑢𝑟 − 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 − 𝑎𝑐𝑖,𝑇 =
∑ 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑎𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑇𝑗
𝑁𝑗
                                                             (4) 
                       𝐷𝑢𝑟 − 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝑎𝑐𝑖,𝑇 =
∑ 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑎𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑇 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒%𝑖,𝑗,𝑇𝑗
∑ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒%𝑖,𝑗,𝑇𝑗
                          (5) 
 
The second long-term fund investment measure we consider is the churn ratio.  The churn 
ratio has been widely used to proxy for fund investment horizon (see, for example, Gaspar, et al., 
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2005; Yan and Zhang, 2009; Cella, Ellul, and Giannetti, 2013). Instead of focusing on the fund 
level churn ratio, we measure the average churn ratio across passive funds for a stock, as follows:  
First, the turnover of stock i by passive fund j in quarter t is given by: 
                              𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =
|𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1∆𝑃𝑖,𝑡|
𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡+𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
2
 ,                                                  (6)    
where 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  are price and number of shares of stock i held by passive fund j at the end of 
quarter t. We then calculate the churn ratio of passive fund j for stock i by averaging across the 
prior 4 quarters: 
                                   𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡(𝑟) =  
1
4
  ∑ 𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−𝑟+1
4
𝑟=1                                                                    (7) 
Similarly, we calculate stock-level churn ratio by equally averaging 𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡(𝑟)  or averaging 
𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡(𝑟)  using passive fund ownership of stock i as the weight across all passive  funds holding 
that stock:  
                                         𝐶𝑅 − 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ 𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡(𝑟)𝑗
𝑁𝑗
                                                                           (8) 
                           𝐶𝑅 − 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ 𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡(𝑟)∗𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥%𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑗
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥%𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑗
                                                      (9)
 We also select active funds and calculate stock-level churn ratio in active funds, by equally 
averaging 𝐶𝑅 − 𝑎𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑡(𝑟)  or averaging 𝐶𝑅 − 𝑎𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑡(𝑟)  using active fund ownership of stock i as 
the weight across all active funds holding that stock:  
                   𝐶𝑅 − 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 − 𝑎𝑐𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ 𝐶𝑅 − 𝑎𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑡(𝑟)𝑗
𝑁𝑗
                                                                          (10) 
       𝐶𝑅 − 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝑎𝑐𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ 𝐶𝑅−𝑎𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑡(𝑟)∗𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒%𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑗
∑ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒%𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑗
                                                        (11) 
 Panel A of Table 1 reports the time-series mean, standard deviation, minimum, median, and 
maximum values of the cross-sectional averages of duration, churn ratio, and proportional stock 
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ownership for passive funds and active funds across 51 quarters. The holdings duration’s measure 
is winsorized at the 1st percentiles and expressed in number of quarters.  The churn ratio and 
ownership measure are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Stocks in passive funds have an ownership- (equal-) weighted average holding duration of 
7.910 quarters (7.118 quarters). In comparison, stocks have an ownership- (equal-) weighted 
average duration of 5.785 quarters (5.289 quarters) in active funds, which suggests that passive 
funds tend to hold stocks for relatively longer periods. Similarly, stocks in passive funds have a 
smaller churn ratio compared with those in active funds. On average, index funds own 4.7% of the 
outstanding shares of stocks they invest in.  As expected, active funds hold less diversified 
portfolios, and on average, they hold a larger proportion of the shares of stocks they own with a 
mean of 10.3%.  Panel B of Table 1 reports the time-series averages of cross-sectional correlations 
between duration, churn ratio, and index ownership. As expected, the correlation between duration 
and churn ratio is negative and equals -0.434 for the ownership-weighted measures, and -0.38 for 
equal-weighted measures.  Moreover, ownership- (equal-) weighted duration is positively related 
to index ownership at 25.3% (21.9%), but as expected, the churn ratio measures display much 
lower correlations with index ownership. 
Figures 1, 2, and 3 depict the time-series trends for our key variables. Figure 1 shows that 
passive ownership increases over the years, from around 1% in early 2003 to over 7% in late 2015. 
The obvious increase occurs in late 2008, which coincides with the growing importance of passive 
funds, especially following the global financial crisis. In contrast, active ownership is relatively 
stable at around 10% during the sample period, except for a decrease during late 2008. Figures 2 
and 3 compare stock holding’s duration and stock churn ratio for passive funds and active funds, 
respectively. Duration is slightly increasing and the churn ratio is more volatile but decreases over 
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time, suggesting that in general, stocks tend to be held by funds for longer than before. Second, 
passive duration is always larger than active duration, and passive churn ratio is always smaller 
than active churn ratio. Third, during the financial crisis there is a decline in passive duration and 
an obvious increase in passive churn ratio.  
3.3. Measures of relative importance of a stock in passive fund holdings 
In some of our tests, we examine the relative importance of a portfolio weight of a stock held 
by passive funds for the funds’ monitoring incentive. If passive funds overweight a particular stock 
relative to the stock’s weight in the market portfolio, we would expect the funds to have a stronger 
incentive to monitor the stock.   
Accordingly, we construct an excess weight measure for stock i at the end of quarter t: 
  𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑤𝑖𝑡 − 𝑤𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅                                                               (12) 
where 𝑤𝑖,𝑡  is weight of stock i in overall passive fund holdings, and  𝑤𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅̅ is the weight of stock i 
in the market portfolios. We use the value-weighted portfolio of the U.S. domestic equity stocks 
in our sample as a proxy for the market portfolio. We then sort all stocks in our sample each quarter 
into halves based on the excess weight measure, and define a dummy variable important, which 
equals one if a stock’s excess weight is above the cross-sectional median value, and 0 otherwise.  
 3.4 Additional stock characteristics as regression control variable.  
In the subsequent regressions, we include the following stock characteristics as control 
variables:  
Price: share price from CRSP. We exclude stocks priced below $1 or above $1,000. 
Size: stock market capitalization in thousands. 
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Btm: book to market, book value for the fiscal year ended before the most recent June 30, divided 
by market capitalization of December 31 during that fiscal year using data from Compustat and 
CRSP. Btm is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Volatility: standard deviation of monthly returns over the previous 2 years. 
Turnover: average monthly traded shares divided by shares outstanding, calculated over the 
previous3 months. 
Age (months): number of months since first returns appear in CRSP 
Beta: market beta calculated each quarter by regressing a stock’s daily excess return on the daily 
market excess return during the quarter. 
SP_500 dummy: dummy variable for S&P 500 index membership. 
Ret(t, t-3): cumulative gross returns over the past 3 months. 
Ret(t-3, t-12): cumulative gross returns over the 9 months preceding beginning of the filing quarter. 
Ret(t-12, t-36): cumulative gross returns over 2 years before the last year. 
All of the variables except returns are measured quarterly. Panel A of Table 1 shows that 
there are on average 3,726 stocks every quarter. The average firm has a stock price of $27.157, a 
market capitalization of $4.44 million, a book-to-market ratio of 1.107, and a beta of 1.025. 
Average stock volatility and turnover are 12.1% and 17.1%, respectively. Panel B of the table 
shows that duration (churn ratio) has strong positive (negative) correlation with firm age and the 
SP500 dummy, and negative (positive) correlation with volatility and turnover, suggesting that 
these two measures can capture stock-level holding horizons in funds.  Following Yan and Zhang 
(2009), we express all variables in natural logarithms with the exception of stock returns, beta, 
S&P500 dummy, and churn ratio. 
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4. Return predictability of the long-term investment of passive funds 
4.1 Long-term passive fund ownership and future stock returns  
Appel et al. (2016) show that passive funds ownership affects firms’ governance and 
investment decisions. If the monitoring role of passive funds were effective, their long-term 
ownership could have positive impacts on stock performance, everything else equal. We formally 
test this hypothesis (H1 in Section 2) in this subsection. We measure passive funds’ long-term 
ownership by duration and churn ratio, both defined in Section 3. We measure future stock returns 
with three holding periods: return for the next 3 months (3-month-ahead return), return for the next 
12 months (1-year-ahead return), and return from the end of month 12 to month 24 (2-year-ahead 
return).  Each quarter, for each future return measure, we conduct cross-sectional regressions of 
future returns on the passive duration (churn ratio) measure, controlling for other firm 
characteristics. Firm-level control variables include stock market capitalization; book-to-market 
ratio; stock turnover ratio; monthly stock volatility; firm age (number of months since IPO); stock 
beta; SP_500 dummy (equal to 1 if the stock belongs to the SP500 index); past 3-month returns; 
past-12-month returns. Except for beta, the SP_500 dummy, and the past-return measures, all 
variables are in natural logarithms. All returns are in percent. We report the time-series average of 
coefficient estimates from quarterly cross-sectional regressions, as well as the T-statistics (Newey-
West adjusted standard errors).   
Table 2 reports the regression results. The main message is that the duration measure based 
on passive funds holdings strongly predicts future stock returns.6 For 3-month-ahead return 
regressions, the average coefficient on the ownership-weighted passive duration measure (equal-
                                                          
6 We also conduct regression analysis with index% only (1) and with index% and log(duration) together (2). Under 
both circumstances, index% is not statistically significant. Our results stress the role of long-term index holdings rather 
than index holdings at a certain period. 
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weighted passive duration measure) is 0.805 (0.968), statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
effect is also economically significant. For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
ownership- (equal-) weighted passive duration is associated with an increase in the 3-month-ahead 
returns of 0.48% (0.52%).  The return predictability of the index fund holdings duration measure 
extends up to 2 years. The average coefficient for the ownership- (equal-) weighted passive 
duration is 3.133 (3.279) for the 1-year-ahead return regressions, and that for the 2-year-ahead 
return regressions is 2.665 (3.295) for the ownership- (equal-) weighted passive duration. All 
estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. In terms of economic significance, a one-
standard-deviation increase in ownership- (equal-) weighted passive duration is associated with a 
1.89% (1.76%) increase in 1-year-ahead returns, and the corresponding increase is 1.61% (1.77%) 
for 2-year-ahead returns. Other control variables in our sample period are almost all statistically 
insignificant.  In the appendix, we also find that the duration measure based on passive funds 
holdings can predict future excess returns.  
Our second measure for passive funds’ long-term investment in stocks is the churn ratio 
based on the quarterly holdings of passive funds, as defined previously in Section 3. Similar to the 
duration measure, we construct both equal- and ownership-weighted churn ratio measures. We 
repeat the same cross-sectional regression analysis, by replacing duration measures with the churn 
ratio. Table 3 presents the results. Column (1) reports the results for the ownership-weighted churn 
ratio measure, and Column (2) the equal-weighted measure. The results are consistent with those 
of the duration measures. Specifically, for the ownership-weighted measure, the average 
coefficient on the churn ratio is -2.056 for 3-month-ahead and statistically significant at the 1% 
level; and -6.940 and -9.016 for 1-year-ahead, and 2-year-ahead returns, respectively, and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. As the churn ratio is negatively correlated with the duration 
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measure, the negative coefficient is consistent with the notion that stocks that are held longer by 
passive funds have higher future returns. In terms of economic significance, a one-standard-
deviation increase in the churn ratio measure is associated with a 0.236% (0.798%, 1.037%) 
increase in 3-month (1-year, 2-year) ahead returns. Results for the equal-weighted churn ratio are 
negative but less significant. Overall, results based on churn ratio measures are consistent with 
those based on holdings duration measures. To save space, we will only present the duration-based 
results from now on. Churn ratio-based results are available upon request.  
4.2. Passive holdings duration and future stock returns: A portfolio approach 
At the end of each quarter, we rank stocks in our sample based on their weighted passive 
duration measure and form five portfolios, with portfolio 1 being the quintile with the shortest 
duration measure and portfolio 5 the longest. These portfolios are held for 3 months, 1 year, or 2 
years, respectively. As a result, for 1-year and 2-year holding periods, there will be overlapping 
portfolios each quarter, similar to the design of the momentum portfolio strategy adopted by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).   For each month, monthly equal-weighted returns are recorded for 
each portfolio, as well as the average return of the overlapping portfolio returns for each quintile. 
Table 4 reports the time-series averages of monthly returns for each portfolio, as well as the return 
differences between the longest and shortest passive duration portfolios. For each holding horizon, 
we also report portfolio alphas from the time-series regressions of the four-factor model (the Fama 
and French (1993) three factors plus the momentum factor), and the five-factor model (the four 
factors plus the Stambaugh and Pastor (2003) liquidity factor). The results suggest that portfolios 
that have the longest passive duration outperform those with the shortest passive funds duration, 
consistent with the cross-sectional regression analysis. Specifically, when the holding period is 3 
months, the monthly return difference between quintile 5 and quintile 1 is 0.46% based on portfolio 
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raw returns.  The corresponding difference in the four-factor (five-factor) alpha is 0.60% (0.64%) 
per month, and all differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. The results for portfolios 
with 1-year and 2-year holding periods are very similar. The performance difference is due to both 
the outperformance of the long holdings’ duration portfolios and the underperformance of the short 
duration portfolios. For example, for the 3-month holding period, quintile portfolio 5 has a monthly 
5-factor alpha of 0.30%, while the corresponding 5-factor alpha for quintile portfolio 1 is -0.33%, 
with both alphas being significant at the 5% level.  Overall, the results reported in Table 2 to Table 
4 are consistent with hypothesis H1.  
4.3 Return predictability of passive holdings duration:  Evidence based on past stock 
performance  
The evidence presented in the previous sections shows the strong return predictability of 
passive duration measures, which is consistent with passive funds’ effective monitoring role in 
firms’ management. If the permanent ownership of these passive funds provides incentives for 
them to closely monitor firms’ governance and performance, their incentives should be especially 
strong for underperforming firms in which passive funds have had substantial holdings over a long 
period of time. The return predictability of passive holdings duration would in turn be stronger for 
those firms.  We test this hypothesis (H2 in Section 2) next.  
To examine this hypothesis, each quarter we split our sample into halves based on either the 
past 1-year or 3-year stock performance. We then create a dummy variable low, which equals one 
if the past 1-year (3-year) return is below the cross-sectional median, and 0 otherwise. We then 
include both the dummy variable low and the interaction term log (dur-weighted) *low in the cross-
sectional regressions. The interaction term captures the marginal return predictability of passive 
holdings duration for firms with low past returns.  If passive funds have stronger incentive to 
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monitor underperforming firms, we would expect the coefficient for the interaction term to be 
positive and significant. Table 5 reports the results. Columns on the left show results for the case 
in which the prior stock return performance is measured over the past 1-year period, and columns 
on the right show results where the past return performance is defined over the past 3-year period. 
Consistent with the monitoring hypothesis, the predictability of the passive duration measure is 
stronger for firms with poor past 1-year (3-year) performance. For example, for the 3-month return 
regressions, the average coefficient on the passive duration measure is 0.321, which is only 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The interaction term involving the dummy variable low, 
however, is 0.981, which is significant at the 1% level. The implied coefficient on the passive 
holdings’ duration for firms with low prior returns is 1.302, and is again significant at the 1% level. 
For 1-year-ahead return regressions, the average coefficient for the passive duration measure is 
1.889, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient for the interaction term is 
2.481, again highly significant at the 1% level. This implies that for 1-year-ahead returns, the return 
predictability of passive holdings duration for firms with low past returns is more than twice as 
strong as that for high past return firms. For the regression specification involving 2-year-ahead 
returns, the coefficient on the interaction term becomes insignificant. The marginal effect of 
passive holdings duration seems to be diminished at the 2-year horizon7.  
        Interestingly, although the past 1-year return is itself not a significant predictor of future 
returns in our sample, the low past return dummy variable strongly predicts future stock returns. 
For example, when the low dummy is defined over the past 1-year returns, the coefficient on the 
low dummy is -2.905 for 3-month-ahead returns, and statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
                                                          
7 We also conduct analysis by splitting our sample into quintiles based on past 1-3 year returns and then introducing 
a quintile variable [-2, -1, 0, 1, 2] that we interact with duration. Our results remain the same. In the following 
subsample analysis, we also use quintile sorts as a robustness check but our results remain the same. 
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implies that on average, the next quarter return would be 0.85% lower for stocks in the bottom half 
of past 1-year returns, compared to stocks in the upper half. The results are qualitatively consistent 
for 1-year- and 2-year- ahead returns, and when low dummy is defined over the past 3-year returns.  
Overall, the evidence presented in Table 5 is consistent with hypothesis H2, in that passive 
funds have stronger incentive to monitor underperforming firms’ management, and their 
monitoring is quite effective in bringing about performance improvements.  
 4.4 Return predictability of passive funds’ holdings duration:  Firm size and market conditions 
We further hypothesize that monitoring would be more effective for smaller stocks and 
stocks with a greater degree of uncertainty, where passive funds can exert greater influence on the 
firms’ management. We examine this hypothesis (H3 in Section 2) in this subsection. 
Similar to the analysis based on past stock returns, each quarter we split our sample firms 
into two halves based on their market capitalization. We then create a dummy variable small, 
which equals one if the market capitalization is below the sample median value for the quarter, 
and zero otherwise. We include the small dummy and the interaction term log (dur-weighted) 
*small in our regression specifications and examine the marginal effect of duration on smaller 
firms. 
Panel A of Table 6 presents the results.  For stocks at the bottom of the market capitalization, 
passive duration significantly predicts future stocks returns. For 3-month-ahead returns, the 
average coefficient for the duration measure is 0.282 and is statistically insignificant. The 
interaction term with small is, however, significant at the 5% level, with an average coefficient of 
0.715. The implied coefficient on the passive duration measure for smaller stocks is 0.997 and 
significant at the 1% level. For 1-year-ahead returns, the average coefficient for passive duration 
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is larger at 1.544, and only statistically significant at the 10% level. However, the coefficient for 
the interaction term is even larger at 2.231. The implied coefficient on the passive duration is 3.775 
for smaller stocks, which is more than double that for larger stocks. For 2-year-ahead returns, the 
coefficient on the duration is insignificant again. The coefficient for the interaction term is less 
significant, with an average coefficient of 2.129, and the implied coefficient on the passive 
duration for smaller stocks is 3.199. Interestingly, in our sample, stocks in the smaller half of the 
market cap have lower returns on average. The marginal effect of the small stock dummy variable 
is reflected in its coefficient of -1.996 for 3-month-ahead returns, which implies that on average, 
the returns of stocks in the bottom half of the market capitalization are 0.51% lower for the next 3 
months. Results are similar for 1-year- and 2-year-ahead returns.  
In terms of market conditions, we expect that the passive funds’ monitoring incentive would 
be stronger during more volatile periods, when there is greater uncertainty about the performance 
of the stocks they invest in. We use the CBOE VIX index as a proxy for market volatility, and 
repeat the cross-sectional regression analysis for the low market volatility periods (i.e., periods in 
which the VIX measure is below the sample median of 17%) and high market volatility periods 
(with VIX above the sample median value) separately. Panel B of Table 6 shows that the average 
coefficient for passive holdings duration during the high-volatility periods is 0.931 for 3-month-
ahead returns. The coefficient for the 1-year- and 2-year-ahead returns is 4.111 and 3.509, 
respectively, and both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. In contrast, holdings 
duration coefficients for the low-volatility periods remain less statistically significant. Their 
magnitudes are much smaller: The corresponding coefficients for 3-month-, 1-year-, and 2-year-
ahead return regressions are 0.671, 2.159, and 1.674, respectively.  
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In summary, the results in Table 6 suggest that passive funds’ monitoring is indeed more 
effective for small stocks and stocks with a greater degree of uncertainty, consistent with 
hypothesis H3.  
4.5 Passive duration return predictability: Limited resources 
Even though passive funds have strong incentives to monitor a firm’s governance and 
improve stock performance, given their holdings of hundreds of stocks it is unlikely that they have 
the resources to pay equal attention to all of their stocks. We conjecture that the passive funds 
duration measure would have stronger predictability for stocks that are more important in passive 
funds’ holdings (hypothesis H4 in Section 2).   
4.5.1 A stock’s importance in passive funds’ holdings 
To measure a stock’s relative importance in passive funds’ holdings, we calculate a stock’s 
excess portfolio weight in passive funds. As discussed in Section 3, for each stock, we calculate 
the excess weight as the ratio of passive funds’ dollar holdings of the stock relative to total net 
assets of passive funds, and then subtract the stock’s percentage weight in the market portfolio (we 
use the U.S. domestic equity market as the proxy for the market portfolio.). Everything else equal, 
a stock would be relatively more important to passive funds if the excess weight is higher. We then 
split the sample into equal halves each quarter using the median value of the excess weight measure 
as the cutoff point. We define a dummy variable important that equals one if the stock is in the top 
half based on the relative weight measure, and zero otherwise. We then include the dummy 
variable and the interaction term with duration in the cross-sectional regressions. If stocks in the 
top half are indeed more important for passive funds in their holdings, we would expect passive 
funds to have stronger incentives and to allocate more resources for effective monitoring, and 
hence a positive coefficient on the interaction term.  
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Table 7 presents the regression results. Indeed, the interaction between passive holdings 
duration and the dummy variable important have a positive effect on future returns. The average 
coefficient on the interaction term is 0.576 (1.167) for the 3-month- (1-year-) ahead return 
regression, and is statistically significant at the 5% level. However, the average coefficient for the 
2-year-ahead return regression is insignificant from zero. The passive duration itself is significant 
at the 5% level. Overall, the results presented in Table 7 show that the return predictability of the 
passive duration is much stronger for stocks that are more important in passive funds’ overall 
portfolio holdings, consistent with hypothesis H4. 
4.5.2  Russell 1000 vs Russell 2000 stocks 
So far, our analysis is based on the entire sample of U.S. equity index funds and ETFs. 
Although we controlled for a number of firm characteristics in the cross-sectional regressions, it 
is quite possible that our specifications omit certain relevant variables. An alternative approach is 
to compare subgroups of stocks that otherwise have similar characteristics, but have different 
weights in passive funds’ portfolio holdings. To do so, we follow Appel et al. (2016) to directly 
compare stocks at the bottom of the Russell 1000 and the top of the Russell 2000.  Stocks near the 
cutoff boundaries of the indexes should share similar characteristics, including market 
capitalization. As the top 250 stocks in the Russell 2000 index have greater proportional weights 
in the index, however, the passive funds’ ownership of these stocks would be much larger than 
that of stocks among the bottom 250 of the Russell 1000 stocks. We would then expect the 
predictability of the passive funds’ holdings duration to be stronger for the top 250 stocks in the 
Russell 2000 compared to the bottom 250 stocks in the Russell 1000 index.  
We require that the stocks in both the Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 indexes stay in the 
index for at least 2 consecutive years, and the stocks must also be represented in the S12 fund 
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holdings data. 8 We then select the bottom 250 stocks in the Russell 1000 index and the top 250 
stocks in the Russell 2000 index at the end of June each year.  Panel A of Table 8 reports summary 
statistics for these two samples over the period 2011:Q2 – 2015:Q3.  On average, we have 210 
stocks from the bottom 250 stocks of the Russell 1000 index, and 230 stocks from the top 250 
stocks of the Russell 2000 index in our sample. As expected, the average market capitalization of 
the bottom Russell 1000 stocks is larger than that of the Russell 2000 stocks. The average market 
capitalization for the bottom Russell 1000 stocks in our sample is $2.88 billion, and that for the 
top Russell 2000 stocks is $2.49 billion. The passive funds’ percentage holding of the top Russell 
2000 stocks (11.2%) are considerably higher than those in the bottom Russel 1000 stocks (8.4%). 
The difference in passive funds’ ownership is quite significant at the 1% level. The average passive 
funds’ holdings duration for the top Russell 2000 stocks is also higher, at 10.30 quarters, compared 
to that for the bottom Russell 1000 stocks at 9.68 quarters.  
Panel B of Table 8 reports the regression results. Indeed, the return predictability of passive 
funds’ holdings duration is only significant for the top Russell 2000 stocks. For the top Russell 
2000 stocks, the average coefficient on the passive holdings’ duration measure is 1.583 for the 3-
month-ahead return regressions, with a t-statistic of 1.850. For 1-year- and 2-year-ahead return 
regressions, the corresponding coefficients are 5.208 and 8.680, and the associated t-statistics are 
2.90 and 2.26, respectively. On the other hand, none of the coefficients on the passive duration 
measure is significant for the bottom Russell 1000 stocks. Consistent with evidence from tests 
based on stock excess weight, results for the bottom (top) Russell 1000 (2000) stocks suggest that 
                                                          
8 Our results are qualitatively unchanged, as we impose the requirement that stocks continuously remain in the Russell 
1000/2000 index for the past 5 years. 
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passive funds would indeed spend more efforts and be more effective in monitoring the 
performance of stocks that are more important in their portfolio holdings.9 
4.6. Alternative explanations  
One possible alternative explanation for the predictive ability of passive funds’ holdings 
duration is that the increasing popularity of index funds and the investor flows to these funds lead 
to higher valuations for stocks in the relevant indexes. Figure 1 shows that the size of index funds 
has increased dramatically over our sample period.  However, several aspects of the evidence from 
our empirical tests suggest that investor flow-driven price changes are unlikely to explain our 
findings. First, we require that all stocks have 2 consecutive quarters of passive funds’ holdings 
data to be included in the sample. Therefore, short-term positive shocks to investor flows cannot 
directly explain the predictability of future returns at horizons of up to 2 years.  
Second, it is well documented that investors chase past performance. Hence, investor flow-
driven return predictability should be more pronounced for stocks that have been performing well. 
Our evidence, however, shows that the return predictability of passive holdings duration is stronger 
for poorly performing stocks. To more directly control the effect of fund flows, we include an 
additional control variable, namely, the percentage change in quarterly passive funds’ holdings. If 
fund flows affect our results, we would expect the corresponding coefficient to be positive and 
significant, and after controlling for the fund flow effect, the impact of the passive holdings’ 
duration on future stock returns should be weakened. However, we find that the coefficient for the 
percentage change in quarterly passive funds’ holdings is insignificant. Controlling for the change 
                                                          
9 We advise caution in interpreting the results presented in this table, as they are based on only 5 years of Russell 
1000/2000 index constituent data we were able to obtain from FTSE Russell.  
 28 
 
 
in passive fund holdings, the average coefficient for passive fund holdings duration remains 
virtually unchanged.  
Another potential explanation for our findings is that the better performing stocks would 
mechanically enjoy a longer duration of ownership by passive funds’ holdings.  To the extent that 
such stocks continue to perform well in the future, one would expect a positive relation between 
passive funds’ holdings duration and future stock returns. To explore this potential reverse 
causality, we examine the correlation between the duration of holdings measure and past stock 
returns.  In untabulated results, we find that the correlations are in fact quite weak and, in some 
cases, negative.   
5. Long-term return predictability: Passive funds vs active funds  
 We have presented evidence that duration measures based on passive fund holdings predict 
future stock returns, and our results are consistent with passive funds’ incentive to monitor firms’ 
governance and performance. A number of recent papers on mutual funds (e.g., Cremers and 
Pareek, 2016; Lan, Moneta, and Wermers, 2016) argue that long-term funds’ investors may have 
information about firms’ long-term performance, and their patient investment strategy outperforms 
passive funds, especially for active funds whose holdings are different from their benchmarks. 
Given the long-term nature of investments in both cases, it is possible that long-term active funds 
are also simply investing in stocks that benefit from passive fund ownership (Hypothesis H5).  
5.1. Passive fund duration, active fund duration, closet index duration, and stock returns 
We test Hypothesis H5 using the same Fama-Macbeth regression framework as in Section 
4, by regressing future 3-month/12-month stock returns on duration measures based on active 
funds holdings and passive funds holdings. First, we decompose active funds into pure active funds 
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and closet indexers. Following Cremers and Pareek (2016), we define those funds with more than 
60% active shares as pure active funds, and the rest as closet indexers. Since the holdings’ duration 
measure connects funds’ overall holding history, we require that a fund has high/low active shares 
during the entire sample period. Next, we construct duration measures based on holdings of closet 
indexers and pure active funds, separately. Finally, for each return horizon (3-month and 1-year), 
we examine two models. In Model (1), we compare the effect of duration measures based on closet 
indexers and on active funds, and in Model (2) we also include the duration measure based on 
passive funds holdings. 
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 9 report the results for Model (1). For 3-month returns, the 
coefficient of duration based on pure active funds is marginally significant at the 10% level, while 
it becomes insignificant for 12-month returns. The duration measure based on closet indexers is 
0.071 at the 3-month horizon, albeit statistically insignificant. For the 1-year horizon, the 
coefficient is 0.872 and statistically significant at the 1% level. These results are consistent in spirit 
with Harford, Kecskes, and Mansi (2018) that holdings of long-term investors predict higher future 
returns.  
Harford, et al. (2018) include closet indexers as index funds. Closet indexers might be able 
to mimic index funds, but they still have the flexibility to exit their stock positions. Hence, they 
do not necessarily have the same incentives as genuine index fund investors. We next test the 
marginal effects of duration measures based on passive funds holdings and closet indexer holdings, 
respectively. When we include the passive funds’ holdings duration measure in Columns (2) and 
(4), the coefficients on active funds duration decline to 0.247 (0.492) for 3-month (12-month) 
returns, compared to Model (1), and they are statistically insignificant at the 10% level. The 
coefficient on closet indexers’ duration declines to -0.013 (0.512) for 3-month (12-month) returns.  
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It is statistically insignificant for 3-month returns, and only significant at the 10% level for 12-
month returns. By contrast, the coefficient for passive funds holdings duration is 0.390 (3-months) 
and 1.948 (12-months), and remains statistically significant at the 5% level.10 
5.2. Double sorts by stocks in passive funds duration and active funds duration 
To further compare the long-term holdings’ effect on stock returns between passive funds 
and active funds, we employ double sorts of stocks into 5x5 portfolios by passive fund duration 
and by active fund duration.  Table 10 reports the results. In panel A, we first sort the sample of 
stocks into quintiles by the passive duration (dur-weighted) each quarter. Within each passive 
duration quintile, we further sort stocks into quintiles by the active fund duration (dur-weighted-
ac) each quarter. In Panel B, we switch the order of sorting. Therefore, panel A examines the effect 
of active fund duration, controlling for passive fund duration, while Panel B examines the effect 
of passive fund duration, controlling for active fund duration.   
These portfolios are held for 1 quarter and1 year, respectively. We calculate monthly equal-
weighted returns for each portfolio.  For each holding horizon, we also report portfolio alphas from 
the time-series regressions of the five-factor model (the Fama and French (1993) three factors plus 
the Carhart momentum factor and the Stambaugh and Pastor (2003) liquidity factor), as well as 
the difference in alphas between the longest and shortest active durations in panel A (passive 
durations in panel B).  
                                                          
10 We also compare duration in passive funds and in active funds directly, without dividing active funds by active 
share.  Results are similar: for 1-quarter returns and 1-year returns, after controlling for passive fund duration, the 
coefficient on active fund duration decreases in magnitude and is no longer statistically significant. 
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In panel A, for the 1-quarter holding period, the difference in monthly alphas is significant 
at the 5% level only for the two shortest passive fund duration quintiles, with the point estimates 
being 0.537%, and 0.343%, respectively. Alpha differences for the other three passive fund 
duration-sorted quintiles are statistically insignificant at the 10% level. Results for the 1-year 
holding period are similar. The alpha difference (0.556% per month) is significant at the 5% level 
only for the quintile with the shortest passive fund duration (the 1st quintile).  For the next two 
passive duration quintiles (2nd, 3rd), alpha differences are smaller at 0.265% and 0.279% per month, 
and significant only at the 10% level.  For the 4th and 5th passive fund duration quintiles, the 
differences in alpha are statistically insignificant.  
In panel B, for each of the active fund duration-sorted quintile portfolios, alpha differences 
between the portfolio with the longest passive duration and that with the shortest passive duration 
are statistically significant for almost all subportfolios. For example, for portfolios with a 1-year 
holding period, the difference in the 5-factor alpha is 0.665% and statistically significant at the 1% 
level for the shortest active-fund duration quintile, and remains significant for quintiles with longer 
active fund duration.  For quintile 5 with the longest active fund duration, the monthly alpha 
difference is 0.436% and significant at the 5% level. The results are similar for portfolios with a 
1-quarter holding period. The only exception is for quintile 5 with the longest active fund duration, 
where the alpha difference becomes statistically insignificant at the 10% level.   
Overall, our results show that it is the long-term ownership by the genuine index funds and 
ETFs, rather than the active funds’ long-term investment that best predicts future stock returns. 
The evidence is consistent with our hypothesis H5, as described in Section 2.  
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6. Concluding Remarks 
Recent years have witnessed a significant shift in investor interest from actively managed 
funds to low-cost passive funds designed to match the performance of market indexes.  The 
implication of this shift for the governance of publicly traded firms owned by passive funds has 
been the subject of considerable interest and debate.  The conventional view is that ownership by 
passive funds weakens corporate oversight.  However, recent research on this issue has offered a 
very different viewpoints on this issue.  Specifically, Appel, et al. (2016) demonstrate that passive 
fund investors do in fact play an important role in bringing about positive changes in firms’ 
governance policies that lead to improvements in profitability and firm valuation.  Motivated by 
these results, in this paper we further explore the implications of stock ownership by index funds 
for firms’ stock performance over the short-term and the long-term.  
We document a strong positive relation between the duration of passive fund holdings and 
subsequent performance of the stocks they own, both in the short term and at longer horizons of 
up to 2 years.  The positive relationship between holdings duration and future stock returns is 
stronger in the case of poorly performing firms, smaller firms, and firms with larger proportional 
ownership by passive funds.  Further, we find that the predictive ability of the passive funds’ 
holdings duration measure for future stock returns is much stronger for stocks at the top of the 
Russell 2000 index compared to those at the bottom of the Russell 1000 index.  These findings are 
consistent with the notion that significant holdings of passive funds are associated with more 
effective monitoring by the funds.  We rule out a number of alternative explanations for our 
findings, including investor fund flow-driven price pressure and the potential for reverse causality.  
We also provide evidence that our results are not driven by closet indexers. Overall, the evidence 
in this study confirms that passive fund investors contribute to shareholder value creation.  Since 
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‘exit’ is not an option for passive funds, they appear to bring about improvements in firm 
performance by actively engaging with the firms they own and exercising the power of their 
‘voice’ over the long-term.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics. The sample consists of U.S. common stocks from 2003.q1 to 2015.q3. 
Dur-weighted is the weighted average time that a stock has been held by passive funds over the previous 5 
years (in quarters), using passive ownership as a weight. Dur-equal is the equal-weighted average time a 
stock has been held by passive funds over the previous 5 years (in quarters). CR-weighted is the weighted 
average of turnover of passive funds holding a stock, using passive ownership as a weight. CR-equal is the 
equal-weighted average of turnover of passive funds holding a stock. Index% is percentage of shares held 
by passive funds. Duration, Churn Ratio, and ownership in active funds are similarly defined. These 
variables and other control variables are defined in Section 3. We eliminate stocks with missing market 
capitalization or book value of equity data, and stocks with prices below $1 or above $1,000. We require 
that a stock be held by one fund for at least two consequent quarters. Duration is winsorized at 1st 
percentiles, and expressed in quarters. Churn Ratio, ownership, and book-to-market ratio are winsorized at 
1st and 99th percentiles. 
Panel A: Time-series statistics of cross-sectional averages 
Variable Mean Std dev. Min Median Max 
Passive Funds:      
Dur-weighted  7.910 1.458 5.287 7.581 10.179 
Dur-equal  7.118 1.260 5.071 6.827 9.100 
CR-weighted 0.118 0.027 0.084 0.116 0.213 
CR-equal 0.132 0.019 0.104 0.127 0.181 
Index% 0.047 0.019 0.010 0.047 0.079 
Active Funds:      
Dur-weighted-ac  5.785 1.171 3.944 5.567 7.582 
Dur-equal-ac 5.289 1.346 3.265 4.847 7.472 
CR-weighted-ac 0.161 0.017 0.133 0.160 0.198 
CR-equal-ac 0.182 0.023 0.142 0.182 0.229 
Active% 0.103 0.007 0.084 0.105 0.114 
Control Variables:      
# Stocks 3726 280 2595 3714 4303 
Price 27.157 5.245 15.841 26.715 38.014 
Size(1000s) 4436.570 1130.440 2634.710 4194.000 6967.550 
Btm 1.107 0.310 0.578 1.136 1.753 
Volatility 0.121 0.025 0.094 0.112 0.180 
Turnover 0.171 0.025 0.128 0.169 0.234 
Age (months) 220.723 17.719 193.064 217.063 254.184 
Beta 1.025 0.113 0.746 1.022 1.243 
Ret(t,t-3) 0.038 0.109 -0.277 0.034 0.342 
Ret(t-3,t-12) 0.133 0.236 -0.371 0.115 0.795 
Ret(t-12,t-36) 0.374 0.410 -0.456 0.330 1.611 
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Panel B: Time-series mean of cross-sectional correlations 
   Dur-weighted Dur-equal CR-weighted CR-equal Index% 
Dur-weighted 1.000     
Dur-equal 0.842 1.000    
CR-weighted -0.434 -0.412 1.000   
CR-equal -0.327 -0.380 0.728 1.000  
Index% 0.253 0.219 0.008 0.089 1.000 
 Price Size Btm Volatility Turnover Age Beta 
SP_500 
dummy 
Ret(t,t-3) Ret(t-3,t-12) Ret(t-12,t-36) 
Dur-weighted 0.071 0.057 0.045 -0.161 -0.105 0.455 -0.062 0.238 0.014 -0.011 -0.080 
Dur-equal 0.010 -0.009 0.094 -0.138 -0.144 0.448 -0.086 0.212 0.009 -0.037 -0.147 
CR-weighted 0.016 0.092 -0.048 0.141 0.227 -0.208 0.182 -0.135 0.034 0.077 0.014 
CR-equal 0.177 0.262 -0.093 0.037 0.270 -0.110 0.157 0.036 0.075 0.156 0.072 
Index% 0.234 0.307 -0.070 -0.091 0.344 0.304 0.290 0.205 0.020 0.021 0.003 
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Table 2: Stock duration and future returns 
 
This table reports quarterly Fama-Macbeth regression estimates for 1-quarter-ahead, 1-year-ahead, and 2-
year-ahead stock returns on passive funds’ stock duration and stock characteristics. Stock-level passive 
duration is dur-weighted by ownership weighted in Column (1) and dur-equal by equal weighted in Column 
(2) across all the passive funds holding that stock. Sample period is from 2003.q1 to 2015.q3. All variables 
except beta, SP500 index membership, and returns are expressed in natural logarithms.  Returns are in percent. 
Standard errors are based on the Newey-West (1987) estimator.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ret(t,t+3) Ret(t,t+12) Ret(t+12, t+24) 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Intercept 1.590 1.392 2.937 2.760 1.007 0.483 
 (0.853) (0.754) (0.297) (0.278) (0.104) (0.049) 
Log(Dur-weighted) 0.805*** 0.968*** 3.133*** 3.279*** 2.665*** 3.295*** 
 (3.663) (3.890) (3.056) (3.492) (3.431) (3.462) 
Log(Size) -0.144 -0.136 -0.146 -0.145 0.082 0.089 
 (-0.767) (-0.738) (-0.245) (-0.244) (0.138) (0.150) 
Log(Btm) 0.164 0.143 1.568 1.513 1.453 1.391 
 (0.615) (0.535) (1.356) (1.288) (1.507) (1.413) 
Log(Turnover) -0.007 0.008 -0.817 -0.781 -0.437 -0.407 
 (-0.032) (0.033) (-1.339) (-1.255) (-0.715) (-0.651) 
Log(Volatility) 0.541 0.498 2.719 2.588 3.477 3.442 
 (0.632) (0.584) (1.510) (1.425) (1.357) (1.325) 
Log(Age) -0.133 -0.142 -0.336 -0.265 -0.249 -0.338 
 (-1.055) (-1.033) (-0.910) (-0.799) (-0.490) (-0.619) 
Log(Price) -0.002 -0.002 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.005 
 (-0.637) (-0.624) (0.824) (0.857) (0.949) (1.027) 
Beta -0.192 -0.165 -0.912 -0.813 -1.148 -1.083 
 (-0.511) (-0.441) (-1.368) (-1.173) (-1.638) (-1.535) 
SP_500 dummy 0.175 0.168 1.180 1.204 1.292 1.313 
 (0.390) (0.382) (0.684) (0.676) (0.719) (0.716) 
Ret(t,t-3) -0.003 -0.003 -0.025 -0.025 -0.041 -0.041 
 (-0.291) (-0.292) (-0.839) (-0.825) (-1.559) (-1.545) 
Ret(t-12,t-3) -0.001 -0.000 -0.036 -0.035 -0.029 -0.027 
 (-0.043) (-0.022) (-1.214) (-1.190) (-1.354) (-1.311) 
Adjusted R-square 0.056 0.056 0.051 0.050 0.035 0.035 
Quarters 51 51 51 51 48 48 
Obs 188807 188807 180296 180296 159702 159702 
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Table 3: Stock churn ratio and future returns 
 
This table provides quarterly Fama-Macbeth regressions for future 1-quarter-ahead, 1-year-ahead, and 2-year-
ahead returns on stock churn ratio in passive funds and stock characteristics. Stock level churn ratio is CR-
weighted by ownership weighted in Column (1) and CR-equal by equal weighted in Column (2) across all the 
passive funds holding that stock. Sample period is from 2003.q1 to 2015.q3. All variables except Churn Ratio, 
beta, SP500 index membership, and returns are expressed in natural logarithms.  Returns are in percent. 
Standard errors are based on the Newey-West (1987) estimator. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
 Ret(t,t+3) Ret(t,t+12) Ret(t+12,t+24) 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Intercept 2.370 2.195 6.213 5.851 4.197 3.741 
 (1.261) (1.169) (0.598) (0.568) (0.423) (0.381) 
CR-weighted -2.056*** -0.886 -6.940** -3.512 -9.016** -6.929 
 (-3.445) (-1.271) (-2.280) (-0.963) (-2.626) (-1.531) 
Log(Size) -0.143 -0.152 -0.190 -0.227 0.080 0.086 
 (-0.755) (-0.797) (-0.328) (-0.398) (0.137) (0.147) 
Log(Btm) 0.176 0.169 1.578 1.542 1.426 1.376 
 (0.664) (0.642) (1.382) (1.338) (1.481) (1.427) 
Log(Turnover) -0.001 -0.008 -0.806 -0.825 -0.411 -0.405 
 (-0.003) (-0.036) (-1.332) (-1.347) (-0.661) (-0.618) 
Log(Volatility) 0.527 0.501 2.636 2.549 3.431 3.326 
 (0.614) (0.581) (1.454) (1.399) (1.347) (1.304) 
Log(Age) 0.075 0.112 0.475** 0.576*** 0.356 0.452 
 (0.642) (0.937) (2.294) (2.752) (0.909) (1.199) 
Log(Price) -0.002 -0.002 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.004 
 (-0.663) (-0.604) (0.717) (0.783) (0.616) (0.727) 
Beta -0.170 -0.170 -0.782 -0.754 -1.048 -1.000 
 (-0.454) (-0.455) (-1.165) (-1.122) (-1.480) (-1.412) 
SP_500 dummy 0.178 0.239 1.299 1.445 1.327 1.437 
 (0.395) (0.524) (0.759) (0.835) (0.740) (0.789) 
Ret(t,t-3) -0.003 -0.003 -0.023 -0.023 -0.039 -0.038 
 (-0.239) (-0.249) (-0.749) (-0.749) (-1.532) (-1.519) 
Ret(t-12,t-3) -0.000 -0.001 -0.036 -0.036 -0.028 -0.029 
 (-0.036) (-0.044) (-1.201) (-1.223) (-1.360) (-1.379) 
Adjusted R-square 0.055 0.055 0.049 0.049 0.034 0.034 
Quarters 51 51 51 51 48 48 
Obs 188807 188807 180296 180296 159702 159702 
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Table 4: Portfolio approach  
 
This table reports monthly equal-weighted portfolio raw returns and alphas after controlling for Fama French 
three factors (market factor, size factor, value factor), Carhart momentum factor and market liquidity factor 
(Pastor and Stambaugh,2003). Stocks are divided into quintiles each quarter from 2003.q1 to 2015.q3 
according to stock duration in passive funds dur-weighted, with quintiles 1 and 5 consisting of short- and 
long-duration stocks, respectively. We then report returns for these five portfolios and the return differences, 
which are calculated over the next one quarter, next 1 year, and next 2 years. For returns longer than one 
quarter, we use the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) approach to adjust overlaps. All reported returns are in 
percent per month. *, **, *** represent significance for return difference at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Standard 
errors are based on the Newey-West (1987) estimator. To save space, we only report ownership-weighted 
duration. 
 
  Dur-weighted 
 1 2 3 4 5 5-1 
Ret(t,t+3) 
Raw return 0.809 0.976 1.141 1.135 1.264 0.455*** 
 (1.468) (1.819) (2.214) (2.325) (2.557) (2.947) 
4-factor Alpha -0.273 -0.098 0.066 0.094 0.331 0.603*** 
 (-1.633) (-0.904) (1.022) (1.532) (2.667) (4.497) 
5-factor Alpha -0.334 -0.120 0.069 0.097 0.302 0.637*** 
 (-2.142) (-1.086) (1.018) (1.517) (2.304) (4.952) 
Ret(t,t+12)  
Raw return 0.868 1.011 1.097 1.240 1.377 0.509*** 
 (1.438) (1.702) (1.919) (2.322) (2.495) (3.970) 
4-factor Alpha -0.197 -0.064 0.013 0.194 0.464 0.661*** 
 (-1.068) (-0.555) (0.213) (3.202) (3.858) (4.816) 
5-factor Alpha -0.266 -0.094 0.012 0.195 0.449 0.715*** 
 (-1.624) (-0.834) (0.172) (2.952) (3.442) (5.948) 
Ret(t,t+24)  
Raw return 0.851 1.006 1.119 1.262 1.385 0.534*** 
 (1.534) (1.806) (1.962) (2.417) (2.588) (3.863) 
4- factor Alpha -0.209 -0.061 0.052 0.214 0.470 0.679*** 
 (-1.160) (-0.583) (0.734) (4.650) (3.816) (4.021) 
5-factor Alpha -0.276 -0.093 0.047 0.210 0.462 0.739*** 
 (-1.864) (-0.975) (0.614) (4.261) (3.339) (5.070) 
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Table 5: Subsample results based on past stock returns 
 
This table provides quarterly Fama-Macbeth regressions for future one-quarter-ahead, 1-year-ahead, and 2-year-ahead returns on stock duration in 
passive funds interacted with “low” dummy variable and stock characteristics. Each quarter, we divide the total sample by past 1- year (3-year) 
cumulative returns into halves. If past 1-year (3-year) returns are below the cross-sectional median, then low equals to one, else zero. Sample period 
is from 2003.q1 to 2015.q3. All variables except beta, SP500 index membership and returns are expressed in natural logarithms. Returns are in 
percent. Standard errors are based on the Newey-west (1987) estimator. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  To 
save space, we only report results based on ownership-weighted holdings duration measure.  
 
 
 Ret(t,t+3) Ret(t,t+12) Ret(t+12,t+24) Ret(t,t+3) Ret(t,t+12) Ret(t+12,t+24) 
 Past 1-year cumulative returns Past 3-year cumulative returns 
Intercept 4.254* 9.620 5.155 3.504* 7.820 3.780 
 (1.847) (0.870) (0.534) (1.801) (0.908) (0.437) 
Log(Dur-weighted) 0.321* 1.889*** 2.366*** 0.568*** 2.094** 1.997** 
 (1.719) (2.882) (3.442) (3.023) (2.070) (2.253) 
Log(Dur-weighted)*low 0.981*** 2.481*** 0.531 0.576** 2.318*** 1.595 
 (3.922) (3.233) (1.287) (2.337) (3.414) (1.391) 
Low -2.905*** -8.404*** -3.101*** -1.872*** -7.472*** -3.803 
 (-5.924) (-4.350) (-4.015) (-3.537) (-4.673) (-1.640) 
Log(Size) -0.046 0.163 0.377 -0.026 0.195 0.293 
 (-0.353) (0.325) (0.676) (-0.211) (0.434) (0.536) 
Log(Btm) 0.119 1.429 1.372 0.153 1.535 1.359 
 (0.461) (1.238) (1.406) (0.578) (1.218) (1.398) 
Log(Turnover) 0.082 -0.579 -0.309 0.094 -0.607 -0.035 
 (0.302) (-0.818) (-0.433) (0.338) (-0.752) (-0.043) 
Log(Volatility) 0.236 2.071 2.718 0.182 2.295 2.614 
 (0.365) (1.219) (1.215) (0.295) (1.432) (1.299) 
Log(Age) -0.102 -0.217 -0.191 -0.019 0.013 0.115 
 (-0.979) (-0.652) (-0.418) (-0.199) (0.041) (0.294) 
Log(Price) -0.483 -1.169 -1.107 -0.617 -1.615 -1.192 
 (-0.929) (-0.982) (-0.909) (-1.195) (-1.477) (-1.037) 
Beta -0.261 -1.174* -1.060 -0.308 -0.979 -1.050* 
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 (-0.716) (-1.685) (-1.596) (-0.807) (-1.392) (-1.678) 
SP_500 dummy 0.052 0.828 0.988 0.083 1.031 0.706 
 (0.139) (0.477) (0.558) (0.237) (0.624) (0.391) 
Ret(t,t-3) -0.010 -0.047* -0.048** -0.008 -0.034 -0.030 
 (-0.956) (-1.795) (-2.354) (-0.769) (-1.289) (-1.531) 
Ret(t-12,t-3) -0.003 -0.049* -0.033** 0.001 -0.036 -0.016 
 (-0.316) (-1.909) (-2.242) (0.106) (-1.342) (-1.009) 
Ret(t-36,t-12)    -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 
    (-0.334) (-0.701) (-1.035) 
Adjusted R-square 0.060 0.056 0.037 0.063 0.058 0.038 
Quarters 51 51 48 51 51 48 
Obs 188807 180296 159702 174820 167066 148537 
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Table 6: Subsample results by firm size and market conditions 
 
This table reports estimates from the quarterly Fama-Macbeth regressions for future one-quarter-ahead, 1-
year-ahead, and 2-year-ahead returns on stock duration in passive funds and stock characteristics divided 
by firm size and market conditions. In Panel A, we divide the total sample by firm market capitalizations 
into halves each quarter. If the stock size is lower than cross-sectional median, then small dummy equals 
to one, else zero. In Panel B, we divide sample periods into halves by CBOE VIX index median (17%) in 
our sample period.  Sample period is from 2003.q1 to 2015.q3. All variables except beta, SP500 index 
membership, and returns are expressed in natural logarithms. Returns are in percent. Standard errors are 
based on the Newey-West (1987) estimator. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
confidence intervals.  To save space, we only report ownership-weighted duration.  
 
Panel A: Subsample results by firm size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ret(t,t+3) Ret(t,t+12) Ret(t+12,t+24) 
Intercept 4.681** 14.604 10.589 
 (2.198) (1.362) (1.349) 
Log(Dur-weighted) 0.282 1.544* 1.070 
 (1.021) (1.683) (0.777) 
Log(Dur-weighted)*small 0.715** 2.231*** 2.129 
 (2.081) (2.964) (1.344) 
Small -1.996** -7.709*** -6.369 
 (-2.463) (-4.504) (-1.578) 
Log(Size) -0.163 -0.592 -0.212 
 (-1.276) (-1.107) (-0.567) 
Log(Btm) 0.126 1.408 1.324 
 (0.520) (1.259) (1.389) 
Log(Turnover) 0.039 -0.833 -0.490 
 (0.145) (-1.189) (-0.702) 
Log(Volatility) 0.240 2.091 2.841 
 (0.364) (1.208) (1.275) 
Log(Age) -0.082 -0.206 -0.122 
 (-0.798) (-0.639) (-0.276) 
Log(Price) -0.448 -1.063 -1.080 
 (-0.870) (-0.901) (-0.848) 
Beta -0.225 -1.026 -0.976 
 (-0.555) (-1.392) (-1.425) 
SP_500 dummy 0.277 2.059 2.137 
 (0.714) (1.213) (1.524) 
Ret(t,t-3) -0.002 -0.019 -0.032 
 (-0.227) (-0.725) (-1.664) 
Ret(t-12,t-3) 0.002 -0.027 -0.022 
 (0.212) (-1.047) (-1.370) 
Adjusted R-square 0.061 0.055 0.038 
Quarters 51 51 48 
Obs 188807 180296 159702 
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Panel B: Subsample results based on market conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ret(t,t+3) Ret(t,t+12) Ret(t+12,t+24) 
 VIX>=17% VIX<17% VIX>=17% VIX<17% VIX>=17% VIX<17% 
Intercept 3.797 1.378 10.566 -0.829 12.292** -6.752 
 (1.072) (0.655) (1.228) (-0.096) (2.599) (-0.543) 
Log(Dur-weighted) 0.931*** 0.671** 4.111*** 2.159** 3.509*** 1.674** 
 (3.624) (2.221) (5.305) (2.477) (6.420) (2.804) 
Log(Size) 0.048 -0.109 0.227 0.208 0.724 0.128 
 (0.267) (-0.640) (0.464) (0.367) (0.845) (0.233) 
Log(Btm) -0.174 0.439 0.922 2.025 1.433 1.428 
 (-0.525) (1.309) (0.973) (1.435) (1.104) (1.069) 
Log(Turnover) 0.525 -0.381*** 0.491 -1.749*** 0.447 -1.144*** 
 (1.098) (-2.850) (0.376) (-7.191) (0.346) (-4.491) 
Log(Volatility) -0.205 0.656 0.647 3.326 6.857** -1.261 
 (-0.189) (0.883) (0.459) (0.895) (2.484) (-0.320) 
Log(Age) -0.040 -0.156 -0.268 -0.185 -1.280*** 0.932*** 
 (-0.216) (-1.614) (-0.899) (-0.770) (-4.270) (3.639) 
Log(Price) -1.509 0.596* -3.781** 1.648*** -3.239** 1.209 
 (-1.710) (1.965) (-2.452) (3.164) (-2.305) (1.596) 
Beta -0.220 -0.289 -1.258 -1.065 -2.031 -0.128 
 (-0.307) (-1.126) (-1.338) (-1.250) (-1.117) (-0.197) 
SP_500 dummy -0.553 0.546 -0.462 1.882 2.009 -0.227 
 (-1.178) (1.245) (-0.410) (1.273) (0.833) (-0.253) 
Ret(t,t-3) -0.014 0.008 -0.064 0.023* -0.084** 0.021 
 (-0.968) (0.603) (-1.242) (1.757) (-2.664) (1.465) 
Ret(t-12,t-3) -0.005 0.010* -0.058 0.002 -0.067*** 0.024*** 
 (-0.260) (2.035) (-1.214) (0.272) (-5.475) (3.110) 
Adjusted R-square 0.080 0.040 0.065 0.044 0.037 0.037 
Quarters 25 26 25 26 24 24 
Obs 92215 96592 88393 91903 80148 79554 
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Table 7: Importance of underlying stocks holding in passive funds 
 
This table provides quarterly Fama-Macbeth regressions for future one-quarter-ahead, 1-year-ahead, and 2-
year-ahead returns on stock duration in passive funds interacted with “Important” dummy and stock 
characteristics. Stock excess weight is measured as the difference between a stock’s passive holding weight 
in total passive funds and the stock’s value weight in market portfolios.  We then sort the total sample by 
the excess weight into halves each quarter. If a stock’s excess weight is above the cross-sectional median, 
important equals to one, else zero. Sample period is from 2003.q1 to 2015.q3. Standard errors are based on 
the Newey-West (1987) estimator. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. To save 
space, we only report ownership-weighted duration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ret(t,t+3) Ret(t,t+12) Ret(t+12,t+24) 
Intercept 3.230 5.186 1.004 
 (1.609) (0.525) (0.112) 
Log(Dur-weighted) 0.564** 2.540*** 2.517** 
 (2.564) (2.856) (2.575) 
Log(Dur-
weighted)*important 
0.576** 1.167** -0.182 
 (2.140) (2.610) (-0.159) 
Important -1.431** -1.500 2.568 
 (-2.116) (-1.080) (0.914) 
Log(Size) -0.078 0.329 0.769 
 (-0.632) (0.845) (1.569) 
Log(Btm) 0.139 1.438 1.382 
 (0.619) (1.290) (1.491) 
Log(Turnover) 0.087 -0.699 -0.467 
 (0.330) (-0.908) (-0.617) 
Log(Volatility) 0.227 2.064 2.866 
 (0.340) (1.250) (1.299) 
Log(Age) -0.060 -0.306 -0.408 
 (-0.636) (-0.811) (-0.888) 
Log(Price) -0.446 -1.036 -1.048 
 (-0.895) (-0.881) (-0.842) 
Beta -0.268 -1.236* -1.142* 
 (-0.552) (-1.737) (-1.753) 
SP_500 dummy 0.105 0.811 0.740 
 (0.305) (0.487) (0.436) 
Ret(t,t-3) -0.003 -0.019 -0.029 
 (-0.262) (-0.720) (-1.528) 
Ret(t-12,t-3) 0.002 -0.026 -0.021 
 (0.254) (-1.026) (-1.319) 
Adjusted R-square 0.060 0.055 0.038 
Quarters 51 51 48 
Obs 188807 180296 159702 
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Table 8: Stocks in Russell 1000 Index vs Russell 2000 Index 
 
This table compares stocks in Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 indexes. We select the sample as: (1) a stock 
is held by Russell 1000 (Russell 2000) at the end of June in the previous year and (2) this stock is ranked 
in the bottom 250 of Russell 1000 (top 250 of Russell 2000) at the end of June in this year. Panel A compares 
the summary statistics between the two groups. We provide the mean level of each variable, the difference 
of the mean between the two groups and associated t-values after clustering on individual firms. Panel B 
provides quarterly Fama-Macbeth regressions for future one-quarter-ahead, 1-year-ahead, and 2-year-ahead 
returns on stock duration and stock characteristics by comparing stocks in Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 
indexes.  Sample period is from 2011.q2 to 2015.q3. Standard errors are based on the Newey-West (1987) 
estimator. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. To save space, we only report 
ownership-weighted duration. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Bottom 250 stocks 
of Russell 1000 
Top 250 stocks 
of Russell 2000 
Difference T statistics 
 (1) (2) (1)-(2) (1)-(2) 
Size (1000s) 2878.956 2489.414 389.542 2.65 
Dur-weighted 9.684 10.301 -0.617 -3.85 
CR-weighted 0.090 0.081 0.009 3.24 
Index% 0.084 0.112 -0.028 -11.52 
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Panel B: Fama-Macbeth regressions 
 
 Ret(t,t+3) Ret(t,t+12) Ret(t+12, t+24) 
 Russell1000 Russell2000 Russell1000 Russell2000 Russell1000 Russell2000 
Intercept 3.739 8.534 2.408 64.029 26.858 83.541** 
 (0.446) (0.596) (0.100) (1.439) (1.493) (2.276) 
Log(Dur-weighted) 1.115 1.583* -0.606 5.208*** -3.999 8.680** 
 (1.033) (1.850) (-0.216) (2.901) (-0.839) (2.260) 
Log(Index%) 0.449 -0.503 3.785 -4.189 5.325* -6.767*** 
 (0.740) (-0.363) (1.527) (-1.101) (1.845) (-3.609) 
Log(Size) 0.628 -0.632 4.645* -4.592 -0.189 -8.387* 
 (0.736) (-0.526) (1.824) (-0.999) (-0.143) (-2.111) 
Log(Btm) -0.064 -0.488 -0.544 -0.247 -2.750** 0.328 
 (-0.129) (-0.742) (-0.445) (-0.131) (-2.612) (0.207) 
Log(Turnover) -0.48 -2.548*** -1.675 -7.824*** -3.108* -3.814*** 
 (-0.798) (-3.381) (-0.800) (-6.450) (-1.906) (-3.148) 
Log(Volatility) -1.797 1.798 -5.073 1.862 2.753 -2.039 
 (-1.353) (1.697) (-1.707) (0.603) (0.603) (-0.308) 
Log(Age) -1.068** 0.119 -3.233** 0.292 -0.833 0.31 
 (-2.129) (0.371) (-2.352) (0.371) (-0.417) (0.377) 
Log(Price) -0.004 -0.02 0.005 0 -0.01 0.079 
 (-1.018) (-1.183) (0.364) (0.001) (-1.052) (1.625) 
Beta 0.855 0.064 -2.983** -1.852 -9.276*** -1.114 
 (0.887) (0.082) (-2.357) (-0.719) (-3.183) (-0.398) 
Ret(t,t-3) -0.018 -0.006 -0.143* 0.058 -0.033 0.029 
 (-0.693) (-0.243) (-1.922) (0.820) (-0.284) (0.444) 
Ret(t-12,t-3) 0.018 0.021 0.054 0.06 0.082 -0.013 
 (1.001) (1.551) (1.254) (1.631) (1.340) (-0.573) 
Adjusted R-square 0.094 0.095 0.094 0.090 0.114 0.103 
Quarters 18 18 18 18 15 15 
Obs 3413 3831 3344 3728 2723 2989 
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Table 9: Comparing passive funds and active funds 
This table provides quarterly Fama-Macbeth regressions for future one-quarter-ahead and 1-year-ahead on 
stock duration and stock characteristics. We first divide active mutual funds into closet indexers and pure 
active funds by active share (cutoff 60%) following Cremers and Pareek (2016), and only select the funds 
that continuously belong to either group during the sample period. In columns (1) and (3), we compare 
stock duration in closet indexers and in pure active funds. Next, in columns (2) and (4), we introduce stock 
duration in passive funds and compare the long-term holding effect of passive funds, closet indexers, and 
pure active funds respectively. Sample period is from 2003.q1 to 2015.q3. All variables except beta, SP500 
index members, and returns are expressed in natural logarithms.  Returns are in percent. Standard errors are 
based on the Newey-West (1987) estimator. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels. To save space, we only report ownership-weighted duration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ret(t,t+3) Ret(t, t+12) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 4.163* 3.728* 10.308 8.229 
. (1.771) (1.767) (0.912) (0.741) 
Log(Dur-weighted)  0.390**  1.948** 
  (1.979)  (2.579) 
Log(Dur-weighted-closet 
indexers) 
0.071 -0.013 0.872*** 0.512* 
(0.520) (-0.096) (3.068) (1.797) 
Log(Dur-weighted-active 
funds) 
0.308* 0.247 0.759 0.492 
(1.842) (1.605) (0.956) (0.688) 
Log(Size) -0.117 -0.109 -0.206 -0.148 
. (-0.790) (-0.710) (-0.343) (-0.246) 
Log(Btm) -0.132 -0.138 0.177 0.179 
. (-0.454) (-0.543) (0.151) (0.154) 
Log(Turnover) 0.011 0.003 -0.138 -0.172 
. (0.035) (0.011) (-0.163) (-0.206) 
Log(Volatility) 0.121 0.155 1.398 1.582 
. (0.183) (0.223) (0.829) (0.949) 
Log(Age) -0.002 -0.066 -0.063 -0.404 
. (-0.012) (-0.482) (-0.167) (-0.869) 
Log(Price) -0.499 -0.486 -1.101 -1.064 
. (-1.077) (-1.105) (-0.958) (-0.939) 
Beta -0.319 -0.315 -1.293** -1.330** 
 (-0.588) (-0.539) (-2.076) (-2.171) 
SP_500 dummy 0.015 0.059 0.903 0.798 
 (0.044) (0.197) (0.528) (0.479) 
Ret(t,t-3) -0.009 -0.009 -0.016 -0.017 
. (-0.621) (-0.676) (-0.451) (-0.477) 
Ret(t-12,t-3) 0.000 0.000 -0.017 -0.016 
 (0.038) (0.037) (-0.563) (-0.553) 
Adjusted R-square 0.070 0.071 0.064 0.065 
Quarters 51 51 51 51 
Obs 128234 128234 123455 123455 
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Table 10: Double sort by stock duration in passive funds and active funds  
This table reports monthly equal-weighted double sort (5*5) portfolio five-factor alphas after controlling for Fama French three factors, Carhart 
momentum factor and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) market liquidity factor. Panel A first sorts all the stocks each quarter into quintiles by passive 
fund ownership-weighted duration. Then within each quintile, stocks are second sorted into quintiles by active fund ownership-weighted duration. 
Panel B switches the sequence: First sort all the stocks into quintiles each quarter by active fund ownership-weighted duration, and second within 
each quintile group, sort stocks into quintiles by passive fund ownership-weighted duration. The portfolios are held for either 3 months or 12 months. 
We report the monthly five-factor alphas (in percent) as well as the difference in alphas between portfolio 5 and portfolio 1 for the second sorting 
sequence. We follow Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) to adjust overlaps. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Standard errors 
are based on the Newey-West (1987) estimator. 
 
Panel A: First sort by passive duration (rows), and then sort by active duration (columns) 
 
 
 
 
  Ret (t, t+3) Ret (t, t+12) 
  
Second sort: Stock duration in active funds (Dur-
weighted-ac) 
Second sort: Stock duration in active funds (Dur-
weighted-ac) 
  1 2 3 4 5 5-1 1 2 3 4 5 5-1 
1 5-factor alpha -0.628 -0.383 -0.138 -0.171 -0.091 0.537** -0.528 -0.341 -0.379 -0.051 0.028 0.556** 
  (-3.177) (-2.552) (-0.909) (-1.020) (-0.465) (2.223) (-2.512) (-1.861) (-3.472) (-0.319) (0.118) (2.246) 
2 5-factor alpha -0.141 -0.259 -0.073 -0.049 0.202 0.343** -0.216 -0.130 -0.035 -0.000 0.049 0.265* 
  (-1.108) (-1.699) (-0.608) (-0.368) (1.337) (1.995) (-1.569) (-1.091) (-0.272) (-0.003) (0.307) (1.695) 
3 5-factor alpha -0.031 0.025 0.076 0.185 0.199 0.230 -0.109 -0.076 0.149 -0.001 0.170 0.279* 
  (-0.258) (0.281) (0.995) (2.191) (1.642) (1.334) (-0.759) (-0.857) (1.338) (-0.005) (1.618) (1.972) 
4 5-factor alpha -0.042 0.129 0.129 0.107 0.211 0.253 0.186 0.097 0.194 0.172 0.247 0.061 
  (-0.354) (1.414) (1.615) (1.331) (1.893) (1.612) (1.832) (1.743) (3.807) (1.711) (2.207) (0.462) 
5 5-factor alpha 0.132 0.196 0.264 0.329 0.458 0.326 0.225 0.291 0.423 0.510 0.610 0.385 
  (0.809) (1.680) (2.044) (2.789) (1.764) (1.596) (1.297) (2.749) (2.741) (2.922) (1.910) (1.339) 
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Panel B: First sort by active duration (rows), and then sort by passive duration (columns) 
  
  Ret (t, t+3) Ret (t, t+12) 
  Second sort: Stock duration in passive fund(Dur-weighted) Second sort: Stock duration in passive fund(Dur-weighted) 
  1 2 3 4 5 5-1 1 2 3 4 5 5-1 
1 5-factor alpha -0.649 -0.192 -0.305 -0.231 -0.168 0.481*** -0.579 -0.257 -0.345 -0.310 0.086 0.665*** 
  (-3.072) (-1.343) (-2.016) (-1.923) (-1.059) (2.668) (-2.528) (-1.662) (-2.326) (-2.028) (0.493) (3.080) 
2 5-factor alpha -0.198 0.023 -0.017 0.159 0.198 0.396** -0.014 -0.109 -0.173 -0.011 0.245 0.259* 
  (-1.156) (0.188) (-0.191) (1.972) (1.421) (2.240) (-0.098) (-1.024) (-2.163) (-0.106) (2.216) (1.898) 
3 5-factor alpha -0.076 0.017 0.064 -0.022 0.156 0.231* 0.042 0.085 -0.003 0.153 0.360 0.318** 
  (-0.465) (0.158) (0.801) (-0.292) (1.448) (1.685) (0.303) (0.745) (-0.030) (1.848) (2.852) (2.429) 
4 5-factor alpha 0.024 0.004 0.187 0.278 0.309 0.286** -0.003 0.058 0.108 0.156 0.398 0.401*** 
  (0.160) (0.042) (2.143) (3.380) (2.926) (2.204) (-0.024) (0.578) (1.499) (2.393) (2.753) (3.461) 
5 5-factor alpha 0.160 0.181 0.251 0.357 0.376 0.216 0.203 0.188 0.280 0.435 0.640 0.436** 
  (1.173) (1.738) (2.214) (3.992) (1.610) (1.034) (1.309) (1.665) (2.731) (4.327) (2.462) (2.022) 
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Figure 1: Time-series trends of fund ownership 
 
This figure plots time-series trends of passive fund ownership and active fund ownership from 2003.q1 to 
2015.q3 
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Figure 2: Time-series trends of stock level duration  
 
This figure plots time-series trends of stock duration in passive funds and in active funds from 2003.q1 to 
2015.q3 
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Figure 3: Time-series trends of stock level churn ratio  
 
This figure plots time-series trends of stock churn ratio in passive funds and in active funds from 2003.q1 
to 2015.q3 
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Appendix Table A_1: Stock duration and future excess stock returns 
This table reports estimates from quarterly Fama-Macbeth regressions for future one-quarter-ahead, 1-year-ahead and 2-year-ahead returns on stock 
weighted-duration in passive funds and stock characteristics. Excess returns are calculated as raw returns minus risk-free rates in Column (1), raw 
returns minus value weighted market returns in Column (2), and raw returns minus value-weighted industry returns, which use Fama French 49 
industry classifications, in Column (3).  Sample period is from 2003.q1 to 2015.q3. All variables except beta, SP500 index membership, and returns 
are expressed in natural logarithms.  Returns are in percent. Standard errors are based on the Newey-West (1987) estimator. *, **, *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. To save space, we only report ownership-weighted duration. 
 
 Ret(t,t+3) Ret(t,t+12) Ret(t,t+24) 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 2.256 -0.155 0.304 3.717 -6.933 -2.489 1.780 -7.769 -3.095 
 (0.982) (-0.079) (0.198) (0.348) (-0.944) (-0.536) (0.173) (-1.124) (-0.737) 
Log(Dur-weighted) 0.799*** 0.783*** 0.792*** 3.110*** 2.843*** 2.583*** 2.584*** 2.481*** 2.077*** 
 (3.850) (3.856) (4.478) (3.186) (3.453) (4.661) (3.478) (3.642) (4.191) 
Log(Size) -0.033 -0.026 0.002 0.205 0.300 0.261 0.414 0.472 0.328 
 (-0.243) (-0.196) (0.016) (0.406) (0.631) (0.803) (0.718) (0.862) (0.751) 
Log(Btm) 0.137 0.138 0.139 1.446 1.251 1.070 1.389 1.268 0.966 
 (0.521) (0.533) (0.752) (1.279) (1.178) (1.653) (1.450) (1.413) (1.631) 
Log(Turnover) 0.065 0.074 0.033 -0.629 -0.560 -0.728 -0.333 -0.247 -0.586 
 (0.237) (0.272) (0.117) (-0.895) (-0.892) (-1.206) (-0.470) (-0.374) (-0.944) 
Log(Volatility) 0.232 0.160 0.044 1.946 1.773 0.690 2.735 2.503 1.284 
 (0.352) (0.239) (0.063) (1.173) (1.132) (0.422) (1.222) (1.207) (0.692) 
Log(Age) -0.099 -0.087 -0.186* -0.233 -0.094 -0.533** -0.183 -0.089 -0.443 
 (-0.951) (-0.837) (-1.878) (-0.717) (-0.302) (-2.098) (-0.406) (-0.213) (-0.995) 
Log(Price) -0.436 -0.378 -0.363 -1.036 -0.694 -0.601 -1.037 -0.753 -0.395 
 (-0.841) (-0.769) (-0.724) (-0.893) (-0.676) (-0.581) (-0.843) (-0.678) (-0.354) 
Beta -0.257 -0.246 -0.254 -1.155 -0.681 -0.249 -1.071 -0.723 -0.028 
 (-0.700) (-0.668) (-0.799) (-1.643) (-1.001) (-0.331) (-1.621) (-1.150) (-0.053) 
SP_500 dummy 0.008 -0.049 -0.111 0.749 0.119 -0.075 0.903 0.306 0.112 
 (0.022) (-0.127) (-0.290) (0.434) (0.069) (-0.046) (0.498) (0.174) (0.067) 
Ret(t,t-3) -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.020 -0.017 -0.025 -0.032* -0.026 -0.024* 
 (-0.215) (-0.176) (-0.633) (-0.758) (-0.713) (-1.349) (-1.698) (-1.515) (-1.803) 
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Ret(t-12,t-3) 0.002 0.003 -0.000 -0.027 -0.023 -0.024 -0.022 -0.015 -0.012 
 (0.213) (0.272) (-0.004) (-1.049) (-1.025) (-1.226) (-1.372) (-1.128) (-1.254) 
Adjusted R-square 0.060 0.059 0.050 0.054 0.053 0.048 0.037 0.036 0.032 
Quarters 51 51 51 51 51 51 48 48 48 
Obs 188807 188807 184540 180296 180296 176259 159702 159702 156912 
